Why Don't We Stop When We're Ahead?

Declaring victory before we have to

I’m currently reading The Korean War by Max Hastings. It’s probably the 20th century American war I know least about, and there aren’t nearly as many books about it as there are about the others. I was pleased to discover that Hastings had written one, even if it is about 40 years old. Hastings is a very good historian and some of his books, like Retribution, are excellent.

I’d known some of the basics of the conflict, but it’s striking to see it unfold. I hadn’t understood, for example, how badly our armed forces had deteriorated in the five years since World War II ended. It helps make sense of the extreme back and forth nature of the early months of the war. I am at the point in the conflict where the Chinese are engaging the UN forces in strength, and Hastings raises the obvious questions: Would they have done so if we had not crossed the 38th parallel?

Perhaps not, but it doesn’t matter because we did cross it. As I’ve read about and considered the tempo of the war, it seems to me that the even more interesting counterfactual is this: Was it even possible for us to have restrained ourselves from crossing? Was it possible for America and her allies to stop while we were ahead?

Initially, the war was an American-led United Nations effort to drive the invading North Korean communists back. The plan was relatively modest; drive the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel, which had been the artificial dividing line between north and south. Even that seemed unlikely at first, as the UN forces were quickly driven back to a tiny part of the country and on the verge of defeat. After the landings at Inchon, though, the momentum shifted enormously and the communists were routed. At that point, the Americans (who were really in charge, despite it being a UN operation) had a decision to make. They wanted to avoid war with Russia or China, but now it seemed possible not only to liberate South Korea, but to unify the country and drive the communists out entirely.

So, Douglas MacArthur was given permission to cross the parallel and continue what seemed to be an almost guaranteed path to complete victory. American leadership was confident that the Chinese would decide the risks of entering the conflict were too great, and stay out. They were wrong. The Chinese entered the conflict in strength, pushing back the UN forces and changing the nature of the war.

Back to the question, then: Was it possible for us to have stopped at the parallel and claim victory, having totally succeeded at our objectives? It might not seem like an interesting “what if” because it would have largely left the North and South as they are today, split at the 38th parallel. On the other hand, what would Chinese and American relations look like? What about the United Nations? America and others entered the conflict after a unanimous UN resolution. Such a globally-supported police action had never before happened, and never would again. What if Korea had been a dazzling American-led, UN success? Could it have transformed the role that body plays in the world?

To answer my own question, I do not think there is any way we would have stopped. First, it was precisely because the war was going so well that we felt obligated to pursue additional objectives. Second, Douglas MacArthur was at the zenith of his power and influence. He certainly wasn’t going to stop, and no one was yet willing to try and stop him. Even if you take MacArthur out of the picture I think the story stays the same. There was simply too much momentum for any one person to slow or reverse.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur and President Harry Truman during the Korean War

Everyone knows the phrase “stop while you’re ahead” but there are three problems. First, it always feels completely counterintuitive to stop while you’re ahead. Second, how do you know when you’re ahead enough but without stopping too early? Third, what about all of the people who are telling you to keep going? How do you know if or when they’re wrong?

The answers to the second two questions are probably specific to each circumstance; I don’t think there’s a general answer that applies in every case. This is probably why there are so many examples of people who went too far and so few of people who stopped at the right time. George Washington comes to mind immediately as an example of someone who understood when it was time for him to step back. It’s important to remember, though, how shocking his decision was, and how many people wanted him to stay on as president. It’s only in hindsight that we universally acknowledge Washington’s wisdom.

The first thing (how counterintuitive it is to stop when you’re ahead) is worth considering. The reason I wonder about whether the Korean War could have turned out differently is because it went badly. Stopping when you’re ahead comes from the conviction that it would be better to end now than continue, but it’s very difficult to think that’s true when you’re winning. Even a little bit more winning is good, right?

When it comes to nations, I think this sort of thing is inevitable and impossible to change. Countries (especially America) want to win and do not forgive loser leaders. Now, sometimes a country keeps going because it has to finish what it started. I’ve written before about the Richard Frank book Downfall. One of the things that made Japan’s leadership resist surrendering was the idea that if they could only win one big battle, the Americans could be brought to the bargaining table. As Frank lays out all the preparations Japan made for the inevitable American invasion of the home islands, that hope does not seem entirely delusional.

However, Frank observes that Japan misunderstood the accountability American’s leadership faced. If Truman accepted anything less than the complete defeat of Japan, the American people would have demanded his head. Stop while America was winning? Absolutely not. It simply wasn’t possible. The attack on Pearl Harbor (as well as some of Japan’s actions during the war) created a momentum that could not be stopped. I would also argue that the American conviction that Imperial Japan had to be entirely dismantled (not merely defeated) was probably correct.

But this is very different from the euphoria that gripped the nation during the early days of Korea. The war against Japan was one of grim determination, not intoxicated hubris. Notice in both cases, though, that the options of the nation’s leadership were limited by what they thought Americans would allow. Negotiate with the Japanese? Never. Stop when you have the communists on the run? No way. It’s easy to blame the people in power but they are, in the end, a reflection of us and our own desires. Why can’t countries stop when they’re ahead? I suppose the short answer is they might, if we let them.